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/ldopting points 7 and 8 of its resol!ttton of 18 October 1966,(1) the Europea?J Parliament c~sked its responsible commit-
tee to draw up a report showmg what measures could be taken to conceutrate research ll'ithm the Commumty and ni<tke 
the most of Euratom's Joint Centre by bringing all areas uf research ll'ithm zts purview. 
On 10 Apnl 1967 the Committee 011 Energy, Resectrch and Atomic Problems asked Mr. Bersani to draw up tbis report. 
On 25 May 1967 the Comnuttee decided to enlarge the lltttitdcltc originally gwe11 to L11r. Bersam, so as to bring the whole 
f1eld of EMopean techuology and scieuce policy within the scope of bis report. 
At its meeting of 22 Ju11e 1967, the Enlarged Bureau of the E~tropean Parliameltt gave its assent to tbis dcczsion. 
Bearing i11 mind the dectSiom takeu by tbe Council of tbe Europeall Commumtles 011 31 October 1967 cotJcemmg tbe 
puhcy for research and tech11ology, the Comnnttee o1t Energy, Resect/ cb und Ato1mc Problems deczded tu a.rsess tbe situ,ztt0/1 
through the medium of au intermt report for the benefit of tbe gc11crul public in the Cummu11ity countries. 
On 27 No!/ember 1967, Mr. Bersani submitted tlm report (Doe. 146/67) to the Europe,w Parliament. 
!11 passi11g the resolution introducing the report,(2) the European P.w!tamuzt c<~lled on its Com11nttee 011 Euergy, Research 
and ,:ltomic Problems (in point 16) to follou• the unplementcztion of a wmmotJ researcb policy ulld to submzt a report 
in due course. 
The Commzttee devoted its meeting of 5 February 1968 to a dzscussiun u•ith the Commiwon of tbe Communities on 
tbe problems rctiscd by tbe Ettropeall policy for research and technology. 
It resumed its study of these questions ctt its meetings of 4 Alarcb 1968 i!i lspra, 30 April 111 La Casczccia and 14 June 
at Julich. 
At its meeting of 22 Febmary 1968, furthermore, the Committee dewled to append to Mr. Bersan/s repo1·t tbe memo-
rctndum jointly dr,twn up witb the Brztish experts after tbe mtdings tbt' Committee had held witb tbon OH 23 and 
24 Octobt'r 1967 to discuss EuropeaH scientific and technological co-operatwn. 
At its meeting of 22 Marc!J 1968 the BMeau of the Eltl'ope.!il Pttrliamellf gaz•e zts ttgreement to tb!S. 
This motion for a resolution and explancttory statemellt were llnctmmollsly adopted by tbe Committee elf its meeti,ng 
of 16 September 1968. 
The follou•ing u•ere present: Messrs. Bousch, Actiug Chairma11; Oele, Vice-Cbairman; Bersa11i, Rapporteur; Angioy, Bebrendt 
(deputizing for Ll-Ir, Lautewcblctger), Bergmann, Berthom, de Bruglit, Brunht's, Hougardy, Kuluu•tg, Leemans, Lenz, Lucius, 
Miss Lulling (deputzzing for Mr. Arendt), Messrs. Memmel, Postbumus (deputzzmg for Mr, l'dztterrand), Radoux, Rctedts 
and Springorum. 
(1) O.G. No. 201 of 5 November 1966, p. 3+55/66. 
(~) O.G. No. 307 of 18 December 1967, p. 6. 
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The Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic Problems hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution and explanatory statement: 
Motion for a resolution 
on the European policy for research and technology 
The E11ropean Parliament, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic 
Problems (Doe. 112/68), 
1. Recalls that it has, on many occasions, stated its attitude to the policy on 
scienttfic research and technology; 
2. Views with great concern the delays in achieving the aims laid down by the 
Council in its Decisions of 31 October and 8 December 1967, especially bearing in 
mind that research and technology are axiomatic to economic expansion and that the 
technological gap between Europe and the major technological powers is increasing; 
3. Is perturbed by the continued inactivity of the working party set up in 
pursuance of the Council Decisions referred to, at the faltering of scientific co-operation 
both within the Community and European scientific organizations and the threat still 
hanging over Euratom's existence owing to its complete lack of any activity programme; 
4. Warns the general public and the Community authorities of the danger of 
going back to national programmes and idt>as in the field of scientific research and 
technology; 
5. Commends the Commission's effort~ in contributing, within its power, to the 
achievement of a genuine Community research policy; 
6. Urges that a more rational use of the resources and experience of the member 
States be made to put an end to the waste of time, money and manpower stemming 
from a failure to bring national programmes into line with each other; 
7. Calls upon the member States to comply with the Euratom Treaties and the 
medium-term economic policy and communicate details of their various national 
programmes for technological research to the Commission so that the necessary 
recommendations for co-ordinating European science may be made; 
8. Renews its request for a suitable system of European patents and a legal 
dispensation for European companies, and for a harmonization of the financial aid 
and fiscal systems of the member States; 
9. Recommends that the Community be vested with appropriate financial auton-
omy to enable the responsible Commission agencies to draw up and carry through 
action programmes under satisfactory conditions of stability; 
10. Reaffirms the urgent need for (a) new programmes to be worked out for 
Euratom's Joint Centre, (b) improving its structure and operation, and (c) a precise 
indication as to how Euratom's experience and structure could be harnessed to industrial 
objectives once it emerges from its chronic state of impotence in the technological 
sector; 
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11. Stresses that a genuine policy for research 111 the Community presupposes 
co-operation that is not limited to research centres with respect to the fundamental 
sectors but which also involves the industrial utilization of results so that research 
is directly linked with industry in order to bring about a real industrial strategy at 
Community level; 
12. Recalls that the seven research areas selected by the Council on 31 Octo-
ber 1967 when considering possibilities of Community co-operation were to be 
regarded as the initial basis of a wider and more consistent programme, and particularly 
deplores the fact that these areas have not been extended and that no programme 
has been submitted for other sectors; 
13. Notes, on the other hand, that the implementation of a Community research 
policy implies a 'Europeanization' of the universities so that the free movement of 
lecturers and students may be ensured, together with the harmonization of >yllabuse:, 
and diplomas; 
14. Stresses the importance of creating and developing as soon as possible useful 
relations between the universities, industry and public and private research laboratories 
as part of a European research policy, bearing in mind the reform in the university 
structures taking place in the member States; 
15. Is aware of the importance of stepping up work on dis:,eminating lllformatton 
and documentation to implement a European research policy and requests the Commis· 
sion to submit practical proposals to provide the necessary means for enlarging its 
own activity in sectors having an importance equal to that of Euratom; 
16. Stresses the desirability of extending scientific and technological co-operation 
to third countries, particularly those that have applied for membership of the 
Communities; 
17. Expresses its satisfaction at the talks organized at parliamentary level by the 
Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic Problems with a group of British experts 
to look into the possibilities of co-operation on research and technology between the 
Six and the United Kingdom and suggests that initially the two parties should concen-
trate on specific subjects and programmes, particularly the seven sectors referred to 
in the memorandum issued at the end of this meeting as wider co-operation could 
then be envisaged to facilitate subsequent membership; 
18. Requests that an early and positive decision be t:tken on budding a European 
isotope separation plant which could be one of the aims in the context of co-operation 
between the Six and the United Kingdom; 
19. Instructs its Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic Problems to keep 
a close watch on the implementation of this Community policy for scientific research 
and technology and to submit a report on the subject in due course; 
20. Asks its President to forward this resolution and the explanatory statement 
relating thereto to the Council and the Commission of the European Communities. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Introduction 
1. Less than a year ago the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Atomic Problems submitted an interim 
report to Parliament on Europe's policy for scientific 
research and technology (Doe. 146/67). The pur-
pose of this report was to keep public opinion 
posted on the latest developments in the Commu-
nity's policy in this field, particularly following the 
Council deosions of 31 October 1967. 
The intention was that the Committee should 
wntinue looking into these matters and then submit 
1ts conclusions in a report. 
Meanwhile, events have shown that the general 
publ1c m Europe is taking a growtng interest in 
the serious situation that has arisen in the field of 
co-operation between the member States over 
scientific research and technology; we shall discuss 
these events later in this report. 
Atomic research is governed by a Treaty which 
lays down quite definite obligations for the Six; but 
even here we find an increasingly pronounced 
resurgence of the natiOnal principle and the gradual 
paralysis of Euratom even though the latter could, 
with 1ts Joint Research Centre, have helped finding 
an original solution to the problem of Europe's 
leeway in this vital area. 
We 'hould l1ke, within the scope of this report, 
to .dd that new ideas on research have to be given 
a c hanet:, the gen~r.1l public's awareness of the prob-
lem underlines this need. 
The time has come to review the Community's 
progress with regard to its policy for research and 
technology, bearing in mind developments since 
October 1967 and the fact that this report follows 
on from the interim report of November 1967 and 
the various moves made by Parliament to stimulate 
the Community's activity in the field of scientific 
research Jnd te~hnology ( 'ee, in particuhr, the 
report by Mr. Oele, Doe. 97 !66). 
I-The Council decisions of 31 October 
and 8 December 1967 
The worsening state of research 
in the Community 
( aJ AJ~tdj•Jis of the Cou11ci! decision of 31 October 
and 8 December 1967 
7 The interim report of November 1967 
recorded with satisfaction the resolution passed by 
the Council on 31 October 1967: 
'in view both of its manifest resolve to take 
vi Q,Orom action to promote .'-cientific and tech-
nical research and industrial progress, and in 
view of the importance attached to early and 
constructive decisions on Euratom's future 
research work.' 
On that occasion, as we know, the Council 
reaffirmed its determination to act in a dual direc-
tion, viz: 
(a) improving and standardizing legal and fiscal 
conditions conducive to the advancement of 
research and development in the Community; 
(b) looking into the possibilities of Community 
co-operation in some particularly interesting 
areas of research and development. Seven sec-
tors were selected for this purpose: data pmces-
sing, telecommunications, transport, oceanogra-
phy, mc:tJllurgy, environmental nuisance and 
meteorology. The working party on the policy 
for scientific and technical research was a.sked 
to show what possibilities there were for GO-
operation benveen the Six in these seven fields 
and to submit a report to the Council by 
1 March 1968; this was the group known as the 
'Marechal' working party-this being the name 
of its Chairman-and it was part of the Medium 
Term Policy Committee; it was given its terms 
of reference by the Council. 
The Council also asked this working party to 
make J. comparative analys1s of what the Six were 
doing in respect of research: their plans, program-
mes and budgets. 
bstly, the Council re-emphasized the importance 
it attached to early decisions on Euratom's future 
research activities. 
3. In this respect, the decisions of 31 October 
were part and parcel of the Council decision of 
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8 December 1967 on the future activities of 
Euratom; (the European Parliament returned its 
Opinion on this in the Oele report, Doe. 182 I 67). 
The purpose of this decision was to get Euratom 
re-started on a new basis and it stipulated that 
Euratom's work would in future be covered by a 
joint programme, involving the work of the Joint 
Nuclear Research Centre and association contracts 
having the unanimous approval of the Six, on the 
one hand, and supplementary programmes involving 
only the States concerned, on the other. 
The Council asked the Permanent Represent-
atives' Committee for a report by 1 March 1968 
on activities which could be covered by association 
agreements. 
It was intended that the Council should endeavour 
to take its final decision on the breakdown of work 
between the joint programme and the supplementary 
programme by 30 June 1968. 
4. These decisions taken at the end of 1967 
appeared, at the time at least, to justify a measure 
of optimism that the Community's policy for 
research and technology would be getting under 
way agam. 
Indeed, research problems were envisaged 
comprehensively and the Gouncil was guided mainly 
by the Marechal working party's report entitled 
'Towards a policy for research and innovation in the 
European Community.' 
At the same time, a number of priority research 
areas, where it was felt that there could be effective 
Community co-operation, were selected. 
Lastly, the schedule for decisions implementing 
a Community policy appeared to reflect a recogni-
tion of their urgency, both because of the Commu-
nity's leeway in most research areas and because of 
the risk of a return to individual national policies, 
a risk that would soon become apparent if the 
Community policy took too long to materialize. 
The decision of 8 December 1967 made it clear 
that Euratom was in the throes of a crisis. 
It provided the basis for getting Euratom off to a 
new start, it was more realistic about the choice of 
programmes despite the danger of creating a 
piecemeal Europe should the 'full return' principle 
become in any way institutionalized. 
(b) The worsening of the situation since the 
beginning of 1968 
5. It has to be admitted that the optimism, which 
was reasonable at the time when these decisions 
were taken, evaporated a few months later. To 
make matters worse, the centrifugal trends appear 
to be increasing; this is shown by the example of the 
European scientific organizations, which are in a 
state of chaos and where the withdrawal of certain 
States makes the likelihood of action programmes 
being carried through open to question. 
In the early months of 1968, therefore, European 
scientific co-operation did not appear to have 
improved; on the contrary it was in a very much 
worse situation. 
6 
What is the position at present? 
6. Despite the hopes expressed in the interim 
report, the urgency attaching to the problems 
involved was not enough to prompt the member 
States to abide by the time schedules set in the 
Council decisions of 31 October and 8 Decem-
ber 1967. 
The Marechal working party had a deadline of 
1 March 1968 for submitting a report to the 
Council on the possibilities of co-operation in the 
seven .sectors stipulated by the Council at its meeting 
of 31 October 1967. This time-limit was not 
adhered to because some member StatesC) quest-
ioned the value of going on with the work initiated. 
Thts naturally held up all the work which was 
supposed to follow the submission of the report. 
The Permanent Representatives were in turn unable 
to submit the policy conclusions to the Council by 
the agreed date of 1 June 1968. 
This had two immediate results: (a) the time 
schedules unanimously set up by the Council on 
"\ 1 October were not adhered to and this is liable 
~o worsen Europe\ leeway in 'ectors viral to 
economic expansion; the Community will thus not 
be able to make good this lost ground until it 
introduces a common policy for science and 
technology; (b) the possibility of agreements with 
third countries is out of the question because the 
Marechal party report was to have led to policy 
conclusions on the possibilities and forms of 
co-operation with third countries. 
As for work on improving and standardizing the 
legal and fiscal conditions to promote research and 
innovation in the Community, it has to be admitted 
that here, too, as the Commission itself has 
acknowledged, no progress has been made since the 
autumn of 1967. 
7. If one looks into the problems of Euratom's 
future one has to admit that the outlook is equally 
disappointing; the time-limit set on 8 December 
was not kept and the Council meeting scheduled to 
discuss these problems was deferred until the 
autumn of 1968; at present, therefore, no agreement 
has been reached on either the content or the 
form of Euratom's future work within a third five-
year plan (theoretically due to come into force on 
1 January 1969). 
The member States are in serious disagreement 
on which of the current associations should be 
re-incorporated in Euratom's budget (despite the 
publication on schedule of the Permanent Represent-
atives' report to the Council on the future of 
associations for research in the Euratom framework). 
8. This situation is aggravated by the crisis affect-
ing the various European scientific co-operation 
organizations which go beyond the geographical 
scope of the Six and involve most of the States of 
Western Europe. 
(1 1 Italy and Netherlands. 
Indeed: 
(a) on 16 April 1968, the United Kingdom decided 
to withdraw from ELDO in 1972 and not no 
take part in the construction of telecommunica-
tion satellites; 
(b) in April 1968, Italy refused to take part in the 
financing of the TD 1 and TD 2 European 
.satellite construction under ESRO so that this 
organization now has to try and work out a new 
space research programme; 
(c) in June 1968 the United Kingdom made it 
known that it was not prepared to help financing 
the construction of a giant particle accelerator 
of 300,000 m electron volts in the CERN 
framework; 
(d) it would also appear that the construction of a 
European prototype airbus-a pmject involving 
the British, French and German governments-
once again appears to be in jeopardy (the 
Ministers of these three countries being due to 
take a final decision about this project in the 
near future). 
It is, of course, quite understandable for States 
to hesitate in taking part in projects which are not 
always in line with their own priorities. It is also 
understandable that certain countries-Britain in 
particular-should have to restrict their budgetary 
spending on programmes which seem uneconomic in 
relation to the expenditure involved. 
What does seem exceptionable, on the other hand, 
is that these withdrawal decisions were taken unila-
terally without there being any technical justification 
to explain the action taken and without consultations 
with partners about the desirability of making 
changes in the programmes drawn up. 
Be this as it may, the breakdown in these projects 
is bound to have serious repercussions on Europe's 
political future, particularly in any confrontation 
with the Soviet or American .space telecommunica-
tion monopolies at a time when negotiations are 
due to begin (in 1969) on renewing the INTELSAT 
Jgreement. 
9. Thus, not only has there been no progress 
towards a Community policy on research but inter-
European co-operation projects are falling by the 
wayside one after the other even though the Council 
stated on 31 October 1967 
'... over the last few years, the progress of 
European countries in science, technology and 
its industrial applicarions has been slower than 
that of other countries particularly the United 
States; this involves sectors which are essential 
to the development of a modern industrial 
economy; Europe's leeway here is liable seriously 
to prejudice its medium and long-term economic 
and social development.' 
It may be asked why Europe is marking time 
or why, depending on the individual ca.se, the situa-
tion is deteriorating. 
II-The return to national ideas 
and programmes in scientific research 
and technology 
10. It may be asked if this trend does not stem 
from an erroneous assessment of the national 
interest. Admittedly, the States of Eumpe are 
willing to lend themselves to international 
co-operation in some research work because they are 
aware that their limited size and resources (both as 
regards manpower and raw materials) do not permit 
them, individually, to carry through programmes 
essential to their economic and scientific 
deveLopment. 
Too often, however, this international co-opera-
tion is only an expedient imposed by the fact that 
Europe no longer plays the part it used no play on 
the world stage. In fact it is the national program-
mes which really matter, which attract the largest 
appropriations and the greatest number of research 
workers. Programmes for international co-opera-
tion only take a secondary place in the list of 
priorities and are oonsequently under the greatest 
threat at times of budgetary restrictions. This 
narrow and obsolete concept of national egotism 
is the true source of this return to scientific nationa-
lism as demonstrated by the events that have 
occurred since the autumn of 1967: it only leaves 
a marginal commitment to international co-opera-
tion and this can be revoked at will. 
11. The priority given to national programmes 
may assume varying forms. 
The national authority may on occasion take 
over from a supranational authority to which the 
State had, for the time being, delegated powers. 
The Council decision of 8 December 1967 on the 
future work of Euratom is a case in point. In 
future some very important work on technology 
may be excluded from the joint programme and be 
included instead with the supplementary program-
mes involving co-operation agreements with one or 
more member States. 
This was a severe blow to the .spmt of the 
Community; the powers of the supranational agency 
-the Commission-were reduced and those of the 
member States and their representatives were 
increased. 
This represented a regression towards a restora-
tion of national powers at the expense of the supra-
national bodies. 
More often than not, however, this return to 
scientific nationalism is less overt: there is still 
co-operation on the same lines within international 
organizations; but although the legal context is not 
affected by economic nationalism, the spirit govern-
ing this co-operation is on the point of becoming 
quite unrecognizable. This is the familiar principle 
of the 'full return'. This is how the trend among 
member States is being described: not participating 
in joint expenditure unless they get back for their 
own programmes the full amount contributed. 
Such a state of mind naturally warps any form of 
international co-operation but what makes matters 
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even worse is that this is the spirit that is beginning 
to be the rule in most of the international organiza-
tions. 
12. Giving pnonty to purely national objectives 
and relegating international co-operation to the 
second place is a misguided approach. 
Far from being a luxury accessible only to the 
most prosperous States, international co-operation 
in research and technology is, in most fields of 
science, an urgent need. This is the only way of 
avoiding wasting time, experts and money, for this 
is the result of having a multiplicity of identical 
programmes in progress in each individual State. 
13. The most striking example of wastage is the 
nuclear sector. In Europe today there are four 
different fast-reactor programmes competing with 
each other. The first type of reactor which was 
tested some time ago is British; the second, the 
Rapsodie, is French; the third comes under a private 
consortium mvolving Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands and is financed by the governments of 
those countries; the fourth, the PEC, is Italian. 
The expenditure involved in carrying through three 
Community projects totals at least 1,095 m account-
ing units. 
The fact that the States of Europe are following 
divergent courses is demonstrated even more clearly 
in aeronautical engineermg. 
Germany is building its own fighter aircraft. 
France has built a swing-wing aircraft which has 
little chance of becoming 'European' because it 
would involve integrating military strategy and 
technique, which is today inconceivable. Some 
countries, such as Italy and the Netherlands, do not 
seem very interested in the 'Concorde' project, 
preferring the American SST project (in view of the 
difficulties encountered by the Boeing Corporation 
in building a swing-wing supersonic aircraft, this 
project may never materialize). In 1960, France 
proposed a co-operation project to build the 
'Mirage Ill' but the Germans, Dutch and Italians 
chose the American 'Starfighter'. There have been 
other attempts at co-operation between France, 
Britain and the Netherlands with a view to adopting 
European aircraft but these have failed. The 
British do not wish to buy either 'Caravelles' or 
'Transalls'. 
This excludes, however, the Franco-British super-
sonic 'Concorde' and the 'Jaguar' combat aircraft. 
As for the agreement between Germany, Britain 
and France on the European airbus, the German 
and Italian companies seem to prefer an American 
aircraft, although the latter project now seems uo 
h1ve been abandoned. Then again, there is no 
private company in Europe willing to risk hundreds 
of mrllions of dollars in constructing a prototype if 
they are not sure that it will subsequently be used 
by government-controlled airlines. 
74. European scientific organizations have too 
often failed to measure up to the standards of 
efficiency that one has a right to expect of them; 
the management is open to criticism, there is 
instability in the working programmes, staff 
8 
appointments are made on political criteria or for 
geographical reasons, quite regardless of technical 
ability. This has all too often been the pattern. 
In its note to the Council of 15 May 1968 on the 
future of technological co-operation, the Commis-
sion explained this inefficiency by reference to 
four factors: the effort made by the Six on research 
and technology, often involving considerable finan-
cial expenditure and manpower resources 
'has fallen far short of the expected results. 
The main causes of inefficiency in the work 
carried out have been an undue dispersion of 
effort, precarious commitments, insufficient out-
lets and an inadequate association of enterprises 
'.vith the projects.' 
15. These criticisms are justified, but sight should 
not be lost of the fact that these shortcomings are 
not due to excessive supranationality but rather to a 
lack of effective co-operation between the member 
States who, as we have seen, prefer national arrange-
ments. Here, too, the Commission's note to the 
Council of 15 May 1968 gives an illuminating 
explanation: 
'The biggest factor making for inefficiency is 
the way the work is scattered. The commit-
ments to co-operate have never led to a complete 
co-ordination of the work done by the member 
States in the sector concerned. Duplication of 
work a~ between national programmes has 
persisted and the Community programme has 
often appeared not to supplement but to 
compete with some of the national programmes.' 
The future of the work is precarious. This, too, 
proves that there is insufficient awareness of the 
value and importance of international co-operation: 
'E ~eh individual project is every year dependent 
on the political will and on the financial pos-
sibil;t:es of each participant. Should this will 
be lacking or these possibilities not be open, 
then the whole enterprise becomes open to 
question.' 
16. It is to be feared that the regressive trend in 
the field of Community research will continue as 
long as the Community institutions are not endowed 
wt~h the necessary political authority to arrest it. 
As long as Council decisions have to be taken 
unanimously, and as long as the member States 
retain the power to oppose decisions by the supra-
national body and remain the watch-dogs of their 
national interests, without regard for the Commun-
ity interests-unless it be to jeopardize them-it will 
not be possible to extricate Community research 
from its present state of complete stagnation. 
There is at present no supranational political 
authority and the Community will not come to the 
end of the crises now afflicting it until it has. 
The Marechal working party would not have 
suspended its work (for reasons not explicable by 
reference to the scientific subjects studied but which 
came as a result of the determination of some 
governments to stop the work of the Community 
at any price after the French Government's refusal 
to look at the British application) if there had been 
a political authority. 
17. A vigorous drive is thus needed to contend 
with this erupt~on of scientific nationalism and to 
cure Europe of its paralysis. Yet both the Com-
munity institutions and the general public are 
opposed to any return to economic nationalism and 
the dangers it carries with it. For scientific nation-
alism is, indeed, just one of the many aspects of 
political nationalism. 
Ill-Reactions of Community bodies, 
international institutions and the general public 
to the delays and to the danger of a return 
to national principles and programmes 
in connexion with scientific research 
and technology 
1. Reactiom of tbe Commission 
18. The Commission is responsible for defending 
the interests of the Community against the self-
interests of the Six and it has been legitimately 
concerned in recent months at the growing backlog 
in the Council's work on research and technology 
and the tasks it set itself in a time-table drawn up at 
its meetings of 31 October and 8 December 1967. 
The Commission endeavoured to counter the 
trend towards an atrophy of the Community spirit 
and took a firm stand to prevent the use of the veto 
on the Council from becoming the general practice. 
To deal with this, it made proposals intended 
to facilitate the choice of a solution to the major 
problems now facing the Community. It also 
drafted the broad outlines for a second, medium-
term, econom1c policy programme and for the 
future work of Euratom. 
Thus, in every respect, the Commission did what 
was expected of it and the European Parliament 
must here signify its support for the Commission 
in all its endeavours, again expressing its confidence 
in the Commission for the future. 
A more detailed analysis of what the Commis-
sion has done dnce October 1967 will bear this out. 
19. The Commission's determination to possibilit-
ate Community co-operation on research and tech-
nology has been most evident since the Marechal 
working party suspended its work. 
In reply to a question on this matter put on 
13 March 1968-in accordance with the oral 
procedure with debate-by the European Parlia-
ment's Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic 
Problems, the Commission expressed, through its 
Vice-President, Mr. Fritz Hellwig, its concern at a 
state of affairs 'whereby the drawing up of a 
scientific and technical policy for the Community 
was liable to be jeopardized.' 
In view of this danger, the Commission has med 
-so far without success-to bring about an early 
resumption of the Marechal working party's activ-
ity and to draw the Council's attention to the 
responsibilities 1t has assumed in not adhering to 
time-schedules and to the consequences of these 
delays. 
The European Parliament strongly encouraged 
the Commission to persevere and welcomed its 
recent decision to set up a working party to draft a 
programme and a research budget for Euratom· s 
activ1ties in 1969.( 1 ) This may mean that the 
Europe.ln ParliJ ment will be consulted in 1968 (the 
Council undertook to decide on Euratom's future 
activities by 30 June 1968). 
20. The Commission has followed day-to-day 
progress on research work in the Community and 
drawn attention to the consequences of delays. But 
it has also endeavoured to outline future research 
programmes for the Community and to work out 
ways of m::.king Community research more effective, 
by avoiding duplications of effort and other weak 
points which have considerably increased its costs 
and debased its achievements. 
The European Parhament expresses satisfaction 
at the future course proposed by the Commission in 
the draft second programme for a medium-term 
econom·c policy and the conclusions given in the 
Opinion of the Commission to the Council of 
2 April 1968 on 'certain problems contingent on the 
<lpdications for accession of the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Norway and Denmark' and in the Com-
mis'lion's communication to the Council of 15 May 
1968 on 'continuing work in the field of technolog-
ical eo-operation'. 
2 R e.JctiOil.l of I be Europe,m P.trli.JII!ellt 
l I. Since October 196 7 the Parliament has been 
endeavouring (a) to keep alive what chances there 
were for Community co-operation on research and 
technology and (b) to determine the principles of 
future co-operation; this could be wider-ranging and 
more effective for it could involve third countries, 
particubrly the applicant States. 
The supervisory powers vested in Parliament, 
p:m:cularly its Commtttee on Energy, Research and 
Atomic Problems, have been exercised in two ways; 
Parliament has sought to exercise a standing and 
immediate control over Commission and Council 
measures. In .January, Parliament made known, 
through Mr. Oele, its opinion on the reforms 
decided by the Council on 8 December 1967 regard-
ing Euratom's future activities, and expressed con-
cern at the measures envisaged. 
With the same end in view, the Committee 
dec;ded in March to ask the Commission, by means 
of an oral question with debate, why the Marechal 
working party had suspended Its activity, this was at 
its session in May 1968, during the debate which 
followed the report on the work of this body by its 
chairman; Parliament informed the Council of its 
gre:~t concern that this suspension was continuing. 
( l T':e Comm'S'>1011 noted that the Council had not been able 
to ke~p to 1ts Jeus10ns of 31 October and ~ December 1967 
'l':1-l de.::1ded, ilUf<::-Uant to Arttcle 7 of the Euratom Treaty, to 
<,et U"J a W'Jrk:ng party to make a report on all the work done 
,,n the Oa\:!' of Euratom proJects. Tht~ report i<> to be submitted 
r ) th:. C Jmrn~ss1un at the end of September and the end in 
Y c-. .. 1" the fmahzatwn of a programme, covenng a oenod of 
-,e·.·.=rnl ye3r~., which b to be the bas1~ of the research budget 
for !IJ(l9, 
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This permanent and direct control also covered 
the Opinions drawn up by the Committee on 
Energy, Research and Atomic Problems on those 
parts of the General Report on the activities of the 
Communities in 1967 coming within its terms of 
reference (report by Mr. de Lipkowski) and on the 
draft second programme for a medium-term 
economic policy (report by Mr. Brunhes). 
22. Control was also exercised over Community 
agencies concerned with research. The Committee 
attaches great importance to the function and opera-
tion of the joint nuclear research centres. It visited 
the largest of these at Ispra and enquired, during its 
talks there, on the progress of work being done and 
on the scale of the problems arising both in regard 
to future activities and for the teams of research 
workers. 
The Committee also visited the national centres 
at La Casaccia in Italy and Julich in the Federal 
Republic of Germany; through association con-
tracts concluded for certain projects valuable 
contacts with Euratom have been established. 
Visiting these centres has convinced the Com-
mittee on Research, Energy and Atomic Problems 
of the unique value of co-operation between the 
member States of the Community. Only through 
such co-operation will it be possible for the 
European States to carry through projects which are 
of vital importance to Europe's economic expansion. 
23. It is because of this and because co-operation 
needs to involve as many countries as possible that 
the Committee took the initiative of organizing a 
meeting with British experts in October 1967 to 
look into the possibilities, forms and fields of 
application of technological co-operation between 
the Six and the United Kingdom, as envisaged 
m the statements by Mr. Harold Wilson, the British 
Prime Minister. At the close of these talks, a 
memorandum was published (see annex to this 
report, Doe. PE 18.649 clef.) which discusses the 
respective positions of both parties and lays down a 
list of sectors which could, in view of their import-
ance, lend themselves to a practical form of 
co-operation. 
Both sides were in agreement on the need to 
continue with the talks and a further meeting is 
planned for autumn 1968. 
Thus the European Parliament and the Commis-
sion-which have often acted together-have been 
able to help deal with the centrifugal trends that 
have been senously hampering scientific co-opera-
tion, both in the Community and in Europe, since 
October 1967. 
However noteworthy this work may have been, 
it does not seem to have been sufficient to put an 
end to these adverse trends. 
5. Rcactio11s of the r;e11erill public 
and of intematio11al organizations 
24. Fortunately, lt appears that an increasingly 
wide section of the general public is becoming 
aware of the tremendous challenge of the pace and 
the scale of scientific progress now facing Europe. 
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In fact, books and studies dealing with these 
problems have proved to be best-sellers in every 
country in Europe. 
This realization of the danger that threatens 
Europe if it goes back to scientific nationalism, 
which would mean that purely national answers 
would once again take priority over a Community 
one, has been reflected, in recent months, in the 
debates on research problems held in the six national 
parliaments. 
25. Similarly, at the ministerial conference on 
science which the OECD held on 11 and 12 March 
1968, the various problems of fundamental research 
were analyzed, as were the possibilities of reducing 
to manageable proportions the technological gap 
between the highly-industrialized countries and the 
others. A report was published at the conference 
on 'The promotion and organization of fundamental 
research'; this stressed the fact that fundamental 
research is the essential basis for science and techno-
logy and analyzed the innumerable orga111zational 
problems hampering research. To deal with this 
Situation, the report advocated a series of investiga-
tions inno the present state of science in Europe in 
specific sectors and stressed the need to support 
'European' firms. One of the recommendations 
passed by the conference was that a programme for 
financing and selecting projects of a 'European' 
scale ,hould be drawn up for fundamental research 
and a reserve fund created. 
The action taken by other international organi-
zations, the Council of Europe and the UNO, has 
also been very valuable in bringing home to people 
the importance of world trade and of international 
activities in terms of scientific progress. 
These international bodies include NATO. 
Plans for overhauling this institution-to achieve 
closer economic and social co-operation between the 
member States-should also provide for an effective 
exchange of scientific information by enlarging, in 
particular, the existing Committee on Science. 
The problem of using patents concerning tech-
nology and which NATO holds in reserve ought, at 
long last, to be appropriately solved. 
26. Hence it is no exaggeration to say that Com-
munity and international institutions and the general 
public strongly oppose any return to scientific 
nationalism and expect an early solution to get 
Europe- the Europe of science-out of the present 
difficult situation. This hope must not be dashed. 
This is one reason why, as soon as possible, condi-
tions conducive to introducing an effective common 
research policy must be created. 
Under what conditions can such a result be 
achieved? 
JV-Proposals for defining a Community 
research policy 
27. Much has been written on the problems of a 
European policy f.or scientific research and tech-
nology; unfortunately the results achieved so far are 
m no way commensurate with the volume of paper 
devoted to this subject. 
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The results of this co-operation are very slight· 
(i) there is some limited co-operation on nuclear 
questions in Euratom but, as we have seen, this 
co-operation has tended increasingly to become 
looser; 
( ii) there are a few specific projects being carried 
out bilaterally or multilaterally, viz: 
(a) the Goncorde and Jaguar projects between 
France and the United Kingdom; 
(b) the Airbus project between France, the 
United Kingdom and Germany; 
(c) the T ransall aircraft project between F ranee 
and Germany. 
(This is all for aeronautical engineering); 
( iii) the 1968 agreement for the joint construction of 
a prototype fast reactor by Germany, Belgium 
and the Netherlands; the high flux Franco-
German reactor in Grenoble; 
(lv) the work of the specialized international organ-
izations (ELDO, ESRO, CERN. CEST). 
This situation can be accounted for by the fact that 
international scientific co-operation has so far been 
viewed within too narrow an angle: the States or 
the international organizations representing them 
have agreed to carry out a number of specific 
projects and to finance them but went no further. 
Thus the results often appear disappointing because 
of the inadequate technical co-operation between 
research workers of the various participating 
countries and the high cost resulting from bad 
management. 
28. It is clear that for the Community research 
policy to be both effective and profitable it must 
be envisaged comprehensively; it cannot be divorced 
from its economic, political and social context. 
There is a close connexion between the implementa-
tion of the Community policy for research and the 
transition from the Common Market to the second 
stage i.e. from the customs union to the economic 
union. Implementing the common research policy 
is inseparable from the introduction of common 
policies for industry, education and economic affairs. 
This argument in itself invalidates the desire of 
some governments to create a technological com-
munity which would be a kind of fourth community 
covering the technology sector. 
There are however other possible answers for 
tightening the links between the Six and the 
applicant States and enhancing co-operation, as will 
be seen in greater detail in the following paragraphs. 
29. The re-organization of the administration of 
the new Commission has made it possible to entrust 
one of its members with the task of working out the 
entire policy for research in co-operation with the 
general directorate for research on technology, on 
the one hand, and that for nuclear research and the 
management of Euratom's Joint Research Centres 
on the other; this re-organization is therefore to be 
welcomed, for it makes it possible to give to this 
field a unity of design, even though it will be 
subject to different legal systems until the merger 
of the Treaties takes place. The Euratom and 
ECSC Treaties provide for financial participation 
by the Community but there are no precise regula-
tions for other areas of research. 
The unification of the admini~trative otructure 
of the Commission represents a step towards work-
ing out a policy for research and technology within 
the Community context; but it is not enough on its 
own. 
30. To achieve the desired result, a number of 
mea~ures would seem to deserve priority. Through-
out this report_ there has been criticism of the 
States for the worsening situation in research. Yet 
this will continue for as long as national program-
mes have priority over Gommunity programmes and 
for as long as there is no co-operation between 
research teams even though similar experiments are 
being carried out on a national basis. For this vast 
internal market to be created as soon as possible-
and nothing short of this will make it possible to 
devote sufficient resources to the requirements of 
technical progress-it seems essential, as a first step 
(as the Commission stresses in the draft second 
programme for the medium-term economic policy), 
for 'all the interventions by the public authorities to 
come within a coherent framework and to be 
implemented by reference to the right priorities and 
the most effective machinery.' 
The first priority is to concentrate research 
work in the Community context; a comparison 
could then be made of national programmes and the 
award of contracts by the public authorities; a list 
of priorities could eventually be drawn up. 
Only measures such as these will make it 
possible to reconcile the decisions taken in the 
various countries and avoid any duplication of 
effort which is so costly in terms of time and man-
power; a good example of this duplication is the 
competition between the French Phenix project 
and the Belgo-German-Dutch project on breeder 
reactors. 
In this respect, it would be desirable to mtroduce 
a more rational use of the resources available to the 
member States and of the experience they have 
gained (particularly in respect of nuclear centres, 
electrontc engineering, computers and data-process-
ing, etc.). It would be pointless, in fact, for each 
country, seeking to divide its financial resources 
soundly, to engage in research in each of these 
sectors even though it could not afford to appro-
priate for them amounts comparable to those 
appropriated by the big powers. 
This work will not be valid until the knowledge 
and information gathered is satisfactorily dissemin-
ated, and this means using appropriate technical 
and operational machinery. 
31. At the same time, the work on harmonizing 
the legal standards governing research should be 
completed; there are the problems of the European-
type company, European patents and the harmoniza-
tion of fiscal systems. At its meeting of 31 Octo-
ber 1967, the Council stressed the importance of 
these questions and the priority it attributed to 
them, even though no progress at all has been made 
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since then, as the Commission points out in its 
memorandum to the Council on the progress of 
work in the field of technological co-operation. 
32. In addition to these efforts to make national 
programmes more consistent with each other, the 
implementation of the common policy for research 
implies that a supranational agency should be asked 
to viorlc out Community action programmes and 
see to their execution. These programmes should 
include all the major twdertakings which are 
obvwusly beyond the capacity of a single State, in 
particular the construction of a European isotopr: 
separation factory to supply the Community wtth 
enriched uranium. 
The basis for such an organization already exists: 
1t is, of course, Euratom. Its operation and its 
terms of reference, however, need to be overhauled. 
Euratom should re reg,rded as the starting puint 
for the creation of a much wider-ranging organiza-
tion with powers not limited, as is the case at 
present, to nuclear m:Hters but covering the whole 
f eld r f research and technology-pronded it keeps 
i11 close contact w1th industry. 
).). Increasing the powers of Eur.uom would. 
however, be no more than a gesture if 1t continued 
to dc;lend on the States, both as reg,uds the choiCe 
of action programmes and financing them. 
This hold the States have must in future be 
avoided, as must the rec,ulting abme vd11ch leadc, to 
fp·c-year action programmes being abandoned and 
bargaining over the contents of programmes, etc. 
With thi; 1n mind, the aim 1n ovnhauling 
Eur:.tom should be both: 
(a) to m crease the powers of the Commission (the 
increasingly important part played by the 
Permanent Representatives is at presen: tend'ng 
to dcv~1lue these power'>): t!:-le Commis'- ion 
remains responsible to the European Parliament: 
an end should be put to the practice of the ,-eto 
on the Council and its decisions should be taken 
by a qualified majority and no longer 
un:mimously; 
(b) to endow the rdormed Eurato•n with fmancwl 
independence and its own resources. 
This wry important problem has already been 
raised many times. As Mr. Oele pointed out in his 
report on the present situation and Euratom's future 
prospects, this is the only way of ensuring that 
'Euratom retains sufficient independence in the 
choice d action programmes ::u:d in finanong 
projects of general interest.' 
This IS the only way of putting an end to the 
'full return' policy and, again, this is the only system 
that is true to the real Community spirit, which 
should place the general interest above the 
individual interests of the member States. 
The advantages of the financial autonomy, wltb 
which Euratom would te endowed when it has 1ts 
own resources, arc ob\'lous (this problem will be 
hard to solve, however, as long as Eur:1tom's actlv-
itles are limited to research work on prototypes). 
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H,wing 1ts own resource' would give Euratom ,l 
much greater freedom of action in choosing pro-
p;r:unmes :m:! the work in pro,r;ress would not be 
l!able to be called into question when the annual 
budget w~ts drawn up. Euratom would thus have a 
btdget co\·ering the period of years of the action 
pr·-gr.lmme. 
34. This series of measures could get Euratom 
out d irs present difficult situation, which is mainly 
due t:J the het that it is too cut off from the 
cmtsid<: world, particularly the universities and 
industnes; this explains why its work has not been 
followed up 1n industry. A limited use has been 
rrnde of research and association contracts and of 
the common enterprise system and this helped to 
get Euratom out of its scientific !solation; the 
results, however. have been on too \ma:I a scale 
and the work don·.: 111 the Joint Research Cen:rcc, h:1s 
~ llov.-cd for practic'lly no co-operation with the 
industries of the member States. This could hardly 
have been other'.'.-ise: the great error was to create 
~ Commu:1in; whch was too lim1ted in scope and 
wh~ c;c w .r:; could not be mtegrated with the 
resc:.:rch of the member Srates and their industries 
~me\ uni\'ersitJes f0r J :ck of a common p0licy for 
industrY and for lack of adequate contacts with 
md,r..trv and the actdemic world. As the Com-
mission pointed out 1n its note of 1 '5 May 1968: 
't1Je Community is running up against increasing 
~·fficu1tie' ac, nuclear energy enters into i: 
industrial phase ( im·dving .the utilization of 
nuclear energy), particularly because the six 
member St,Hcs differ in their industrial structure 
<md because there 1s no common approach to 
relations between mdustry and the public 
, uthonties.' 
35. Indeed. the efforts made to facilitate a Com-
muntty research policy will proye inadequate unlec;s 
they ,1re followed up in the two contingent fields of 
indusmal policy and educttion-as the Committee 
on En:-rgy. Research and Atomic proble'Tl' point' 
out in 'ts Opinion on the First General Report on 
the activiN:.s of the Communities. 
Rehtwns between universities, industrial con-
cerns ~111d hbor2 turies shnuld be such as to dlow for 
reciprocal exchanges and close links between all of 
them a•:.d reduce to a minimum the time which 
norm: Ily elapses between research work and its 
:ndu<tr•d anplication 
Implementing a common policy for industry is 
of cap::al importance for those industrtes in the key 
sectors, as President Rey stated in the Europe.1n 
P.u~i,,ment on 1 '5 ::\fay 1 <)flfl, 'development implies 
too great a cost and too great a risk for enterprises 
cf \Yhate\·er size to engage in with their own 
resources.' In such a sector, co-operation should 
not only cover research but the industrial applica-
tion of results so as to combine research with 
indl'stry and the universities. 
A genume common policy for research must 
imply tlut co-operation is not limtted, as has so 
often bec:n the case, to fundamental research centres 
( :1ct,1hl) Ematom · s Joint Rese,uch Centres) but 
should also cm-er laboratories engaged in applied 
··esr.:arch and development. 
36. In this respect it is regrettable that the seven 
sectors .selected by the Counol on 51 October 1967 
with a view to exploring the possibilities of Com-
munity co-operation (as stated above, the lvfarechal 
Group was instructed to report on this to the 
Council) are not all of fundamental importance for 
the technological and industrial development of the 
Commttntty c:nd are not all key sectors in technical 
expansion. 
lt is, furthermore, reasonable to suppose that 
comparing the methods, plans and programmes of 
the Six in these sectors will not cf itself give rise 
to a genuine Community policy for industry--
unless there is some overall de:>ign which allows for 
an inter-action between industry and technology. 
The policy for industry is directly linked with 
that £m science and technology; this is obviously 
the next stage. 
This is why the lack of any comprehensive 
pohcy in this sector is liable to be prejudicial to 
the scientific and economic development of the Six 
(as the Commission points out in its First General 
Report, it 1s one of the fundamental tasks facing 
t:Je Community to draw up such a policy). 
It is true to say, however, that progress has been 
made in some sectors. In that coming within its 
scope, the ECSC has endeavoured to lay the founda-
twns for a common industrial policy. The fact 
remains that the efforts so far made have not been 
enough; what is still lacking is a proper mdustrial 
strategy at Community level; this would be based on 
the policy for research and technology geared to 
the key sectors and on a policy for energy, 
employment and occupational training adjusted to 
prevailing circumstances. 
There has so far been no overall design and 
piecemeal work is all that has been done in these 
::ectors. 
The Committee therefore welcomed the state-
ment that President Rey made in the European 
Parliament on 15 May 1968 to the effect that one 
immediate result of merging the Executives was the 
po~sibility of giving fresh impetus to some areas of 
the Community's activities and particularly to the 
policy for industry. To achieve this result the 
Commission intends to deal with the obstacles which 
are still partitioning off the Commumty into separ-
ate departments (there are four legal and fiscal 
obstacles) and adopt specific measures in these 
;ector;., to help (i) old-established enterprise., \vhich 
are either threatened with decline or face structural 
dtfflCulties and (1i) enterprises 111 what are known 
as the key sectors. The Commission is aware of the 
tmportance and urgency of a common policy fm 
industry and it is to be hoped that 1t will soon be 
able to submit practical proposals to the Council 
for this purpose so as to deal with the serious 
consequences resulting hom the unrelated decisions 
taken by the member States 111 this sector. 
37. Relations between research work and the 
universities are equally important. As the Com-
mittee stated in its Opinion on the draft medium-
term economic policy programme 'the universities 
play a decisive part in research both becathe of 
their irreplaceable contnbution to the a lvancement 
of knowledge and in training new generations of 
scientists. More often than not in Europe the 
universities have few ties with firms and industrial 
and cummeroal organizations. 
Europe might do well to follow the American 
example and create 'scientific complexes' which are 
one of the most effective ways of building a bridge 
between the universities, industries, and laboratories. 
Such co-operation naturally implies a constant 
adjustment of the educational system to changing 
econom1c and technical conditions. So far little has 
been done in Europe to endow the organization of 
universities with the flexibility such co-operation 
calls for. \XThat makes matters worse is that the 
structure of the umversities in the Six makes it 
impossible to step up exchanges between research 
workers or to promote the free movement of 
students and umversity teachers of the member 
States; th1s 1s, moreover, made more difficult by the 
bilure to harmonize syllabuses and diplomas. 
38. The resulting difficulties for co-operation on 
research and technology in the Community can be 
imagined. It is thus no exaggeration to say that 
until the universities have been 'Europeanized', it 
will be impossible to introduce a common policy 
for rese1rch. This · Europeanization' should bring 
about the free movement of university teachers and 
students and the harmonization of syllabuses and 
diplomas. 
It was for a long time supposed that creating a 
European university could resolve these difficulties. 
The plans have been in existence for over ten years 
but, so far, the disagreements between the Six have 
made it impossible to achieve them. There was a 
time when the idea seemed to have been dropped. 
The question has, however, become topical again 
so that it could now be investigated from a different 
angle (this is borne out by a statement by Mr. Edgar 
Faure, French Minister for Education, in the 
National Assembly's debate of July 1968 on the 
problems of national education). Your Committee 
considers that a single European university, however 
interesting it may be, would be insufficient by 
i:;elf to give such 'Europeanization' any reality. It 
should rather be regarded as a model for the univer-
Sities of the member States which should open their 
doors to teachers and students from all the Com-
munny countries. 
39. This need to widen the scope of research to 
include the problems of industrial outlets and of 
teaching would appear to be essential to implement-
ing a genuine Community policy; but while research 
must not be cut off from mdustry and the univer-
sitie:', it would be even more regrettable if it were 
d1vorced from the external world. Indeed, even 
if scientific co-operation were extended to the scale 
of the Europe of the Six, the geographic area 
mvolvcd would still be too small. Wherever pos-
sible, the Community should try to co-operate with 
third countries, notably the four applicant States 
and, above all, the United Kingdom. Despite some 
of the inadcquJ.cies in the efforts made by the 
United Kingdom in connexion with research and 
technology (which were stressed by the Commission 
111 its Opinion to the Council on the British applica-
tion), Bntain' s participation in scientific and tech-
nological co-operation with the Six would be of 
exceptional interest no all, bearing in mind the 
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contribution it could make in certain key fields. 
This has been acknowledged by all the Community 
States, as indeed they are all agreed that the United 
Kingdom and the other democratic countries in 
Europe would be highly desirable members of the 
Community. 
42. Some countries would like to give priority to 
the problem of British membership and to suspend 
the development of the Community until Britain 
joins the Common Market; this is the reason given 
by one of the six governements for smpending the 
work of the Marechal Group. 
The Commission took a strong stand against this 
view. In its memorandum uo the Council of 
15 May 1968, it stated that: 
'the difficulties within the Communities smce 
the Luxembourg Resolution was adopted could 
not just1fy the prejudice that the member States 
would suffer together if no fresh effort were 
made to try and solve the problems ansing.' 
Whether or no the United Kingdom belongs to 
the European Communities, these do exist and their 
development requires that early measures be taken 
in certain key sectors in order that, after havmg 
reached the stage of the customs union, the Six 
should now form a genuine economic union. 
In view of their importance for the future of 
Europe, the provisions on research and technology 
are naturally among these measures. In an attempt 
to reconcile their wish to collaborate with the 
British with the urgency .of resolving the problems 
relating to research and technology, some member 
States have suggested setting up a fourth community 
specializing in technology, which would include the 
Six, the Unired Kingdom and the other applicant 
States; they argue that technology is not covered by 
the Treaties of Rome. 
In its Opinion of 2 April 1968, the Commission 
stated it was 'not in favour of creating a technolog-
ical community as distinct from the Communities 
now being merged.' 
The reasons why the creation of such a com-
munity seemed impossible, failing any common 
policies fm education, industry and social and 
economic affairs, have been given. This would 
further be borne out if the United Kingdom were 
to join the technological community and not partio-
pate in the three existing Communities. 
41. Bearing in mind these difficulties, the best 
approach to securing co-operation between the 
United Kingdom and the Six on technology would 
be to begin with specific projects and programmes, 
selected for their priority rating, on which the two 
could work together. 
When the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Atomic Problems of the European Parliament met a 
group of British experts in October 1967, this was, 
furthermore, the prevailing view. 
The memorandum which the two parties 
published at the close of the meeting stressed that 
the main need was to bridge the technological gap 
between the Six and the United Kingdom, on the 
on hand, and the United States and the Soviet 
Union on the other. 
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Co-operation should cover seven specific sectors, 
viz: 
(a) data-processing equipment, 
(b) aeronautical engineering, 
(c) the creation of 'European' companies, 
(d) transport and transport strategy, 
( e! space research, 
(f) nuclear policy (particularly high-energy physics, 
nuclear electricity and molecular biology), the 
creation of centres for fundamental research and 
development. 
42. One of the main aims of this oo-operation 
programme could be the joint construction of an 
isotope separation factory. 
The fact that Europe depends on the United 
States for enriched uranium supplies raises serious 
political problems. 
Considering that the cost of such a project is 
beyond the resources of any single State, co-opera-
tion is essential. The ultra-centrifuging technique, 
when fully developed, would make it possible to 
env1sage producing enriched uranium at much lower 
cost than by using the diffusion method. At its 
meeting of 8 December 1967, when it discussed the 
problems of Euratom, the Council asked a special 
study group from the Consultative Committee for 
Nuclear Research to look into the Community's 
long-term enriched uranium supplies; the Commis-
SIOn was to make suitable proposals to the Council 
on the basis of this study. 
The United Kingdom 1s the only country in 
Europe which produces enriched uranium for non-
military purposes at its Capenhurst factory. 
However, the quantities produced are not very large 
and it could not, on its own, supply the whole of 
Europe. Here the dosest possible co-operation with 
the United Kingdom would be deSl!able. Building 
a factory on a European scale could thus be one of 
the a1ms of co-operation between the Six and the 
United Kingdom. Since the British are eager to 
co-operate, it should be poss1ble to start co-operating 
with them as of now on research and technology 
(even though the recent British withdrawal from 
ELDO and CETS and their refusal to help finance 
the CERN particle accelerator project seemed to 
call th1s desire to co-operate into question). It is 
also reasonable to suppose that this co-operation 
could widen out within an agreement foreshadowing 
membership, beginning, however, with participation 
in specific programmes. 
Indeed, this would forge cLoser links between the 
British and the Community which would, by slow 
degrees, draw the two parties together, in terms of 
both human and economic relations, and progres-
sively lead to Britain's membership. 
43. Developing co-operation with the British is 
inseparable from intensifying intra-Community oo-
operation. If this should cease, as is borne out 
by what has happened since the Marechal Group 
suspended its work, it would preclude any possibility 
of introducing a real common policy for research 
and technology and dim the prospects fm interna-
tional co-operation which mutual interests make 
imperative for all. 
ANNEX 
Memorandum 
on European scientific and technological co-operation 
I-lJJtroductwn 
1. At lts Brussels meeting on 23 and 24 October 1967, 
the Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic Problems 
had an exchange of views with British experts, 
namely Dr. Owen, Dr. Moonman, Sir Antony Meyer, 
Dr. Cop1sarow and Mr. Layton on European technological 
co-operation. Mr. Mario Pedim was in the Chair. 
The meeting resulted from certain voluntary efforts 
and, m a more general sense, from current economic and 
political circumstances. 
2. It orig1nated, m fact, in the need for seekmg greater 
balance between Europe and the United States m the 
field of technology. Indeed, there is abundant evidence 
that technological progress is an essential component of 
economic progress and in th1s respect, there IS good 
ground for the misgivings caused by the widenmg gap 
that separates Europe from the United States. 
Thus it is understandable that considerable interest 
has been aroused in the Community by Mr. Harold 
Wilson's proposal that European technological co-opera-
tion be intensified between the United Kingdom and 
the Six. 
In order to form a clearer picture of the prospects 
afforded by future co-operation in the field of science 
and technology, Mr. Pleven suggested on 25 May 1967 
to the Committee on Energy, Research and Atomic Prob-
lems that an exchange of views be arranged with com-
petent British representatives. This proposal was accepted 
by the Committee, as well as by the Bureau of the 
European Parliament. 
The Committee further decided on 25 September 1967 
to set up, from among its members, a Working Party 
that would be responsible for preparing the meeting. 
II-Comid eratio11s 
3. Those who took part in the debate on 2 3 and 
24 October 1967 in Brussels arrived at the following 
conclusions: 
Whilst fully appreoatmg the fact that research and 
technology matters are closely linked up with economic 
problems m general, the Committee wished to restrict 
discussions to problems falling within its province. More-
over, the Committee deemed it advisable to separate 
problems connected with the setting up of a system of 
technological co-operation embracing the United Kingdom 
from those raised by that country's application for member-
ship of the three existing Communities. 
4. It was felt, m fact, that although 1t was desirable 
to orgamze technological co-operation within the frame-
work of an enlarged European Economic Community, the 
de la) s that will, m all probab!l1ty, occur m achieving 
such an enlargement, made it necessary for the two 
problems to be dealt with separately and for Immediate 
attentwn to be given to the possibilities of bridgmg the 
technological gap between the EEC countries and the 
Umtcd Kmgdom on the one hand, and the United States 
on the other. 
The Brltlsh experts have found m th1s respect that 
d1vergent opmwns were vmced with regard to the pos-
sJblllty of mtruducmg an mtegrated technological and 
soentific policy m case Bntam's application were to be 
reJected, 1t had also been said that the BritlSh Govern-
ment regarded such a policy as Impracticable. Never-
theless, the experts were convmced that however important 
these consideratiOns may be, they v. ere rather premature 
and that they ( 1.e. the experts) would therefore be m a 
better posltlon to formulate their replies when the actual 
condltlons for Implementmg the proposed policy were 
examined 1n detail. 
The Parliamentary Commmce was satJsfied that these 
contacts were useful and that they should be pursued 
w1thout delay. 
5. The Commlttee noted, m particular, the observations 
contamed in the Opinion submitted by the Executive 
Commisswn of the European Commumties to the Counc!l 
on 29 September 1967 regarding the United Kmgdom's 
applicatwn for membership of the Communities; that 
document stressed certain alleged inadequacies or ineffi-
uenoes in Bntain's research and development effort. 
The Committee gave a favourable reception to the 
rephes made by the British experts to the critJcisms 
formulated in the aforesmd document; they assured the 
Committee that the Ministry of Technology created in 
1964 would contnbute, through a rationalization of 
efforts, to a closer form of collaboration between 
mdustnahsts and technicians and that both the Industrial 
ReorganizatiOn Corporatwn and the National Research 
Development Corporation were playing a significant part 
1n the bringmg up to date of Bntain's economy. 
6. The Comm1ttee thus satisfied itself that Britain's 
part1opat1on m an enlarged system of technological and 
soentif1c co-operatlon would be of fundamental value 
to Europe's development 111 view of the important 
conmbution Bntain would be making in a number of 
secton. 
The Commlttee acknowledged that whilst it is possible 
to conceive of the Common Market without the United 
K1ngdom, it would be difficult to reduce the technological 
gap that exists between Europe and the United States 
w1thout Britam's aid However form1dable the obstacles 
to be overcome may be, they did not appear to be 
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m·,urmountablc There 
and technology poliq. 
Bntmn's paruopatwn 
co-operation 
t;, as yet, no Communtty research 
Thts fact could only facilitate 
m a 'ysrem of technological 
-, The tmportance and particular nature of the problems 
ratsed by European co-operatwn m the fteld of technology 
h .ve na~urally caused the Commtttee to consider the form 
wluch such co-operatiOn should take. The mstitutwnal 
aspect of the problem appears to be the one that clatms 
the most a~tentton. The Committee beheves that tt 
would be essential to found the proposed technologtcal 
co-operatiOn on the pnnctple of integratiOn and not on 
that of btlateral or multilateral agreements between States, 
m o~her words, mere formulas of co-operation would not 
make 1t possible to achieve ulttmate aims. It would be 
necessary. m the Commtttee's vtew, to envtsage a com-
prehenstve form of strategy in regard to the problems 
to be solved, in par:tcular those relaung to the structure 
and stze of the markets concerned. Only sectorial 
mtegratton would make this posstble. 
8. The Committee belteved 1t would be advisable, for 
th.s purpose, to create Communtty bodtes that would be 
responstble for each given technological sector and 
endowed with ftnanoal means of their own. Only by 
thts method would tt be posstble to prevent States from 
resorting to the 'full return' formula. This expression 
means, as one knows, the tendency on the part of some 
States to regard as natural the fact that the funds mvested 
by them m Commumty concerns should be redistrtbuted 
to them for wmplettng thelt own proJects 
9. The Commtttee found that on all these pomts the 
feehng of the Bnush experts tallted with ItS own vtews. 
\'Vtth regard to the structure of an organizatton or a 
Communtty v. hose atm was to achieve parttal or full 
tntegration, the Bntish experts felt there was unanimous 
recognitiOn of the fact that 1t was essenttal to provtde 
for independent management and mdependent funds tn 
order to prevent the posstble withdrawal of the ftn.moal 
share of some member States. 
10 To whtch areas should one consider extendtng the 
activities and resources for developtng co-operauon? 
A number of sectors-m vtew of their tmportance, 
thelt urgency and the posstbtht!es they afforded for 
collaboration between the Six and the Untted Kwgdom-
'eemed parttcularly suttable to both parties. 
The two parttes thus agreed that 1t would be destrable 
for the proposed co-operation to cover the followmg seven 
areas: 
1 t) Dutct-pruce.rsmg equipmellt 
( 11) AcTOilctllticct! ell gwcermg 
( 111 I Tbe settiug up uf · Europec~;i' comp,nncr whtch are 
the only ones capable ot secunng the advantage' 
attachmg to large-sized concerns 
(tvl T,,msport and trct//Jpurt stratef!,y 
(v) Sp.zce res~c1rch, with a view to creattng a European 
ktnd of NASA havmg Its own secretariat, effective 
powers and fmanual mdependence 
lvtl Nuc/cc;r poltcJ: this ts a vast sector where co-opera-
tton between the Stx and the United Kmgdom would 
make 1t posstble to launch a number of projects 
concernmg tn parttcular: 
I :11 Hzr;h-unrf!.Y physzcs, espeoally for the construc-
tiOn of a European 300m electron-volt parttcle 
accelerator 
1 b! Nuchctr cle,trnit)', where 1t would be posstble to 
destgn and extend the use of the new reactor 
scttngs and to build an ISOtope separation plant 
1 cl Mohwlt~r bzolor;y. where the settmg up of a 
'European· laboratory appears desirable 
I Vet I T be crco.z:zo/1 uf cel/tres {or bet sic nseczrcb, destgn 
tmprovements and contacts of personnel 
11. The Comm1ttee, for ItS part, IS deltghted at the 
tdentlcal vtews shared by the two parries and notes with 
:,~;1sfaction Btttam's resolve to co-operate in the above-
men~toned sectors, a resolve that was given expresswn, 
tn particular, tn the wtsh that certain Brltlsh firms or 
"orks ( e.g the Capenhurst Enrichment Plant and the ICT 
concern) should serve as a basis for the future pooling 
of resources to an extent that ts in keeptng with the size 
of Europe. 
III-Conclusto/1.1 
I 2 The Commtttee ts grattfted with the encouraging 
nature of the exchange of vtews that has taken place 
c:nd the growtng awareness of the two parties concerned 
of the tmportance and urgency of the problems to be 
solved 
It fmds in particular that, from all stdes, the need 
h~s been stressed for creatmg institutions that would 
ensure technological r.o-ordmatwn, as well as the need 
for swtft actwn m a number of practical sectors. 
Wtth regard to future work, the Committee believes 
that the W orkmg Party should be asked to consider the 
v .mons alternatives as to the form of future European 
co-operatwn m the fields of soence and technology. 
13 The Workmg Party could call upon technicians 
when necessary and would keep the Committee regularly 
tnformed on the progress of its work. 
The Parltamentary Committee felt, moreover, that the 
best means of achtevmg tangtble results would be to draw 
up programmes common to the Stx and to the Bnttsh in 
a number of prionty and fundamental sectors, a ftrst 
ltst of whiCh has been approved by both parttes. 
14. It ts, indeed, by means of a sector-by-sector and 
pomt-by-p01nt examination that it would be really pos-
stble to determine co-operation possibtltttes. Such a 
method would, m addition, allow of some diverstfication, 
depcndmg on the sector concerned, m the structures to 
be created. Ftnally, by proceedtng in this way, it would 
be easter to lay down a ttmetable for the progresstve 
achtevement of the anticipated co-operation. 
The Commtttee ts glad to record the unanimous resolve 
of those that took part m the meeting to pursue these 
exchanges at regular intervals. these would be attended by 
competent representatives m accordance with a procedure 
to be defmed. 
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